Allegheny County Department of Human Services

The Allegheny County Department of Human Services (DHS) is dedicated to meeting the human services needs of county residents, particularly the county’s most vulnerable populations, through an extensive range of prevention, intervention, crisis management and after-care services.

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ACRONYMS

ART  Aggression Replacement Training
CBT  Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy
CIRV  Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence
DHS  [Allegheny County] Department of Human Services
DRC  [Allegheny County Adult Probation] Day Reporting Center
FFT  Functional Family Therapy
MST  Multisystemic Therapy
OVOL  One Vision One Life
PIRC  Pittsburgh Initiative to Reduce Crime
SNAP  Stop Now and Plan
UCPI  University of Cincinnati Policing Institute
VICAST  Violent Criminal Assessment and Strategic Targeting Initiative
VIP  Violence Intervention Project
INTRODUCTION
The Allegheny County Criminal Justice Advisory Board and The Allegheny County Executive’s Public Health Commission on Preventing Violence and Promoting Community Mental Health are seeking answers to the question, “How can we reduce violence on our streets?” So are the thousands of people living in areas of Allegheny County where shootings and homicides (street violence) are strikingly high, where families have to plan their actions with the possibility of violence in the forefront of their minds, and where, despite the difficulty, people are working to rebuild the social fabric of their communities.

To support them in their search for answers, the authors of this report have conducted research on the issue of street violence and proven solutions, a process that included consulting criminologists, reading the literature to understand the roots of the problem and learn about evidence-based strategies for preventing violence, and interviewing more than 50 local practitioners to understand the programs in place in Allegheny County as well as local challenges.

Based upon this information, we identified a set of recommendations designed to reduce violence within the next one to five years.

THE ISSUE
Homicide is a serious problem in Allegheny County, worse than many people think. Although a recent survey\(^1\) found that most Allegheny County residents said that they feel safe in their neighborhoods, the four-year homicide rate in the City of Pittsburgh, at 14.5 homicides per 100,000 people, is higher than the average of all cities of similar size in the U.S. (12 homicides per 100,000 people). It is also higher than the rate in New York City (5.9 per 100,000) and only marginally lower than Washington D.C.’s rate (19.2 per 100,000). Certain areas of the county (e.g., Clairton, Duquesne, Wilkinsburg and McKeesport) have disturbingly high rates of homicide, with a combined average of 27.1 homicides per 100,000 people.

Most of these homicides are due to shootings from street violence, as distinguished from domestic violence or family disputes. For every one homicide there are six shootings in the City of Pittsburgh (Dalton, Collins & Odah, 2013). One study of criminal behavior among

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\(^1\) The Pittsburgh Regional Quality of Life Survey found that most people in Allegheny County feel safer in their neighborhoods than in other locations and that crime has not gotten worse (July 2012).
Pittsburgh’s young adults found that they reported committing 38 violent offenses for every one offense that was ever brought to the attention of the court system (Loeber, 2014). Loeber and others have made the point that the criminal justice system is not aware of the largest proportion of victimization that goes on in the community (Loeber, 2014).

Nearly 70 percent of the shootings are committed by people who are involved with groups or gangs and under the age of 30 (Dalton, Collins & Odah, 2013); in the City of Pittsburgh, these group members — an estimated 0.4 percent of the city’s population — are responsible for 69 percent of the homicides (University of Cincinnati Policing Institute, 2010).

Here, as in other urban areas, “most street gangs are only loosely structured, with transient leadership and membership, easily transcended codes of loyalty, and informal rather than formal roles for the members” (Howell, 2007). In this sense, a “gang” is a group of individuals who engage in criminal activity together, which is the definition used by the University of Cincinnati Policing Institute (UCPI) and other researchers.

A 2010 analysis by UCPI examined City of Pittsburgh homicides during a three-year period, drawing upon intelligence from 30 City of Pittsburgh police from across zones and shifts. For gang-related homicides, the primary reasons were disputes (estimated by police as a cause in 70 percent of the homicides) and drug-related reasons (by police estimates, a factor in 21 percent of the killings).

The individual members of the group are linked to the five to 100 others in their group and, through a social network, tied to hundreds of others in the city through alliances or active feuds. In their meetings with UCPI, police reported that “of the 35 identified gangs, 29 have known relationships with other gangs.” Most of those relationships are volatile or are active feuds, raising the risk of death for members of the group. “People who were friends or friends of friends of homicide victims were approximately 100 times more likely to be involved in a future homicide than people who weren’t” (finding by Papachristos, reported by Buntin, 2013).

The people committing street violence are doing so in relatively few areas of the city and county, at locations even smaller than the neighborhood level. These “micro places” are as finite as a particular block or intersection. In Boston, for example, “micro places with volatile trajectories represent less than three percent of street segments and intersections, generate more than half of all gun violence incidents, and seem to be the primary drivers of overall gun violence trends” (Braga, 2009).

Yet while the violence is geographically very focused, it dramatically affects the surrounding neighborhoods, with families fearful of allowing their children to play outside or older adults afraid to walk to the bus stop. When a shooting occurs, people fear retribution if they speak to police. And the violence is taking a particular and extraordinary toll on African American men.
Without a break in the intensity of violence, it is difficult for people who live in these communities to feel safe, let alone hold together the social fabric of their neighborhoods. In the City of Pittsburgh, the homicide rate for African American men is 21 times the U.S. homicide rate. For African American men who are young, it is 67 times the national average (Dalton, Collins & Odah, 2013).

Without a break in the intensity of violence, it is difficult for people who live in these communities to feel safe, let alone hold together the social fabric of their neighborhoods. This is a battle in which law enforcement, criminal justice and human services must work with these communities to reduce the violence that is destroying their quality of life.

Targeted efforts to reduce street violence have worked in other cities and counties and can work here, too.

**WHERE TO INTERVENE: GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS**

Cities have been able to reduce violent crime by shifting the dynamic within gangs/groups so that the members themselves stop the shooting. They also have targeted youth and adults whose behavioral health and other issues increase their risk of being involved in violence. When joined together in a systematic effort to reduce street violence, these interventions are even more effective.

**Groups**

Groups can exert powerful influence on their members. “Although a single individual may perpetrate a violent act, the group dynamic shapes behavior, how individuals are received by their peers, and how they respond to those who disrespect them” (Engel, Skubak Tillyer & Corsaro, 2011). While it may appear counterintuitive, people who join together to defy the law can use their “informal social control” (as opposed to the “formal controls” of the criminal justice system) to police their own members’ behaviors. Kennedy writes, “The police are not present at every potential crime scene, most crimes that are committed are never reported, most crimes that are reported are never cleared by an arrest, and most arrests do not result in meaningful sanctions. What matters the most is the judgments of individuals, peer groups, families and communities... Common sense, ordinary experience, and a vast amount of research show that informal social control is far more potent, overall, than formal” (Kennedy, 2010).

This is not to say that formal controls do not matter. Research has shown that when people believe the risk of being apprehended is high, they are deterred from committing a crime. This “perceived risk of apprehension” is stronger than prison or the threat of long sentences (Durlauf & Nagin, 2009; and Nagin, 2013).

If groups believe that there is a strong chance that they will be caught and that the criminal justice system will pay a good deal of attention to all of their members if one of their own kills someone, the group leaders will exert pressure to stop the shooting — particularly if their neighbors communicate clear standards for behavior in the community (Kennedy, 2010).

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4 Research findings on imprisonment point to no demonstrated deterrent effect of incarceration and “more to a criminogenic effect than preventive effect” (Nagin & Durlauf, 2012).
Individuals

While changing the self-regulation of the group is vital, so too is addressing the behavioral health needs of individuals at high risk of committing violence, whether or not they are part of a group.

Alcohol problems are particularly implicated in violence, for its use occurs “disproportionately among both juveniles and adults who report violent behaviors” (Hunt & Laidler, 2001). Further, “studies of the drug and alcohol involvement of homicide offenders and victims also support the notion that alcohol is, overwhelmingly, the substance most frequently implicated in this particular form of violence (Parker & Auerhahn, 1998); and alcohol and marijuana use by young people “predicted later violence, but alcohol rather than marijuana appears to be the critical element in the explanation of violence” (Loeber, Farrington, Stouthamer-Loeber & White, 2008).

In a study of serious adolescent offenders, about half of whom had been convicted of violent offenses, researchers found that young offenders had rates of substance abuse that were three to four times that of their non-offending peers (Mulvey, Schubert & Chassin, 2010). Of this group, the subset of young offenders who later desisted from their criminal activity had “lower levels of substance use and greater stability in their daily routines” when compared with the young people who continued to commit crimes (Mulvey, 2011). When the offending youth received treatment lasting at least three months, both their substance use and offending decreased. “Youth whose treatment lasted for at least 90 days and included significant family involvement showed significant reductions in alcohol use, marijuana use and offending over the following six months (Chassin et al., 2009, cited in Mulvey, 2011). Despite the positive effects, however, only a small share of these young offenders received appropriate treatment.

A related issue among violent youth and adults is the co-occurrence of substance abuse and mental health issues. An analysis of data from the large-scale National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions found that, while the incidence of violence for people with severe mental illness was high, it was only significantly high for the subset of people “with co-occurring substance abuse and/or dependence” (Elbogen & Johnson, 2009). In looking back at the childhoods of young men who had committed homicide, the Pittsburgh Youth Study found that they “were violence-prone and had a long history of disruptive and delinquent behavior.” The study also found that “behavioral deviance, particularly conduct disorder... is a predictor of gun carrying and that gun carrying, especially among delinquents, increases the probability of committing homicide” (Loeber & Ahonen, 2014; and Loeber & Ahonen, 2013). While one-third of the boys who were involved with juvenile court had been “diagnosed as having a disruptive behaviour disorder by age 13... less than half of the persistent serious delinquents had received any help from either mental health professionals or from personnel in schools” (Stouthamer-Loeber & Loeber, 2002).

This research points to the need to focus our interventions upon those at high risk of committing violence: the youth with significant risk factors, including those who are already involved with juvenile justice and who may not be receiving services. They and their families need to be consistently involved in evidence-based programs, with the degree of intensity called for in

5 A caution is important at this point: This longitudinal study’s look backward in time can help us to see the risk factors that were present in the young people who would later commit violent crimes, but other children also showed these risk factors and did not engage in serious violence. Risk factors do not predict future violent behaviors; they only point to an increased likelihood.
the treatment model. This stands in contrast to blanketing services to everyone in low-income neighborhoods, including those who may be easier to engage. Similarly, we should ensure that adults who are at high risk of committing violence, and who have behavioral health issues, are receiving evidence-based treatment and services.

**WHAT WE CAN DO TO REDUCE STREET VIOLENCE**

With this understanding of what drives street violence, we searched for specific prevention strategies that have had a measurable impact on violence in the short term, as demonstrated by results documented through strong research studies. The strategies that meet these criteria are:

- Focused deterrence
- Violence interrupters
- Directed patrols that target illegal guns and ammunition
- Evidence-based services that target high-risk youth and adults

There are a number of ways of thinking about interventions (e.g., whether they intervene early in a person’s life or later on; if they work with groups or individuals), but the key is that they actually reduce violence when done with fidelity and that, together, they represent a balanced portfolio of ideas for what law enforcement, human services and the community can do to reduce violence.

**Focused deterrence**

Focused deterrence involves accurately identifying the groups whose members are at extreme risk of killing or being killed and then “pulling the levers” that raise their perceived risk of apprehension. These levers can spur the group to exert informal social control since they know that the entire group will be punished for the behavior of any member who shoots.

Carrying out focused deterrence involves the following steps:

1. Specifying the criminal behavior to be targeted (in this case, shootings and homicides)
2. Gathering accurate and fluid intelligence about known offenders and their social networks, the actual crimes committed, alliances and disputes, and the micro-locations frequented by the groups
3. Informing the group — most of whom are on probation or parole — that law enforcement is poised to act decisively if one of them shoots

Law enforcement may share the evidence they have collected on the illegal activity of each of the group’s members to back up this claim. In this way, it becomes clear to the group that the criminal justice system is paying close attention to them and, if a shooting occurs, the law will be quickly and strictly enforced using the evidence already in hand. Law enforcement may also choose to make an example of an arrest that has already occurred, to show that they are serious about stopping the violence.
4. Pulling the levers that can cause these groups to desist from committing shootings and homicides

Police, probation, the courts, human services and the community all hold levers:

- Police can notify members of these groups that they will take action against them if there is a shooting.
- Probation officers, who have the right to monitor offenders living in the community, can knock on the doors of those under their supervision who are at extreme risk of killing or being killed, to check for illegally possessed guns, without probable cause.
- Health and human services providers can offer group members and other criminals a way out of their lifestyle by helping them to access education, employment, training and treatment. Outreach workers, such as violence interrupters (see below), can focus their mediation and motivational efforts on these group members.
- Community members can convey serious and specific messages to those in the group — for example, standing alongside law enforcement during call-ins to talk about how the prevalence of violence has affected their lives and their neighborhoods.
- The corrections system also can pull levers. The jail can convey the message to group members re-entering the community, promising re-entry services but making sure that they know that Adult Probation will be monitoring them intensively for violent and illegal behaviors. As juveniles leave Shuman Center, Juvenile Probation officers can deliver this same message, combining treatment and services with careful monitoring of any gang affiliation or violent behaviors. A study of the Boston Reentry Initiative found a significant decrease in violent offenses among the high-risk inmates who received individual transition planning and access to mentoring and an array of other services (Braga, Piehl & Hureau, 2009).

The “pulling levers” strategy is typically implemented through targeted communications such as “call-in” sessions at which law enforcement agencies, human service providers and community members meet with those whom intelligence-gathering has identified as being at extreme risk of killing or being killed. A meta-analysis of 10 studies showed that this comprehensive approach had a statistically significant, medium-sized crime reduction effect (Braga & Weisburd, 2012; see also Sherman & Eck; Welsh & Hoshi in Sherman, Farrington, Welsh, & MacKenzie, 2002).

The following examples are illustrative of the results of this approach:

- When Indianapolis was experiencing record levels of violence, a detailed review of homicide incidents dispelled previous beliefs that few were gang-motivated. A task force devised a series of focused deterrence strategies aimed at groups of known, chronic offenders. The task force used “pulling levers” strategies to target members of these groups and to have them spread the message to others in their groups. The initiative offered alternatives to those willing to turn their lives around and showed the community’s support and concern for them. Homicides were reduced by 40 percent (U.S. Department of Justice, Crime Solutions, 2014).
BUILDING POLICE LEGITIMACY
How the levers are pulled matters. If done in ways that focus on violent offenders, then community members will be more likely to share information about criminals. If, however, they see the police saturating the entire neighborhood and sweeping up youth and adults who are not violent offenders, they will view law enforcement as unfair and illegitimate and withhold information.

Research shows that building a cycle of trust between the police and community is a public safety imperative; when the community views the police as fair and acting in its interest, residents are more likely to step forward to identify perpetrators (Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

- The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) systematically identified individuals most at risk as perpetrators and/or victims of gun violence due to group affiliations and activities. Systematic research with front-line law enforcement officers in 2007 provided a vivid picture of a hyperactive offender population in Cincinnati: approximately 0.3 percent of the city’s population, with prior records averaging 35 charges apiece, were members of violent episodic groups (or in some cases, more structured gangs). A review of homicides revealed that these violent groups were associated with three-quarters of the city’s homicides during a one-year period (Engel 2009). From May 2007 through December 2010, intelligence gathering identified 2,431 members of violent groups within the city. Using statistical analyses, geographic mapping and social network analyses, this population was routinely tracked and the information was shared with CIRV partners for strategic deployment of resources. The effort achieved a 40 percent reduction in homicides involving members of these groups (Engel, Skubak Tillyer & Corsaro, 2011).

- The Chicago Police Department is using network analysis to figure out who is likeliest to kill or be killed in each geographic district, then visiting the small number of people who are at extreme risk because of their social networks (usually because of their association with active gang/group factions). These are the “hot people.” To put this picture together, police keep track of who gets arrested together, who has gun convictions, and who has been shot; they use this information to map networks, which tell them who might retaliate and who is at high risk. They then deploy officers to locations where the network analysis suggests that the next shooting is likely to occur. Chicago Police no longer flood areas of concern; rather, they target these specific individuals.

Violence interrupters
Community “violence interrupters” can contribute to reductions in street violence, particularly if there is collaboration with police. (In some cities, violence interrupters are hired as part of a focused deterrence strategy.) CURE Violence is a successful model that has been deemed an “effective program” by the National Gang Center.

CURE Violence aims to reduce street violence by detecting and interrupting violence using data and street knowledge to identify locations and individuals most at risk for violence; outreach workers and violence interrupters then mediate disputes between individuals or groups, counsel group members, and connect them with services. CURE Violence also works to change community norms so that violence is not an expected or accepted way of resolving conflict.
While a violence interruption program can reduce shootings through the work that the interrupters do in mediation, the ways in which law enforcement can use these contacts to get a more current picture of violent groups can also play an important role (key intelligence for their focused deterrence).

A study of CURE Violence (Chicago) showed a reduction in shots fired and a significant decline in shooting incidences. This evaluation indicated significant changes in gang homicide patterns (e.g., decreases in gang involvement in homicides and fewer retaliatory killings) that could be attributed to the program, although no individual site improved on all outcome measures (Skogan, Hartnett, Bump & Dubois, 2000). A study of Safe Streets, a replication model in Baltimore, showed that acceptance of the use of guns to settle grievances declined and, when researchers totaled statistically significant effects, it also resulted in fewer homicide incidents and non-fatal shootings (Webster, Whitehill, Mendel, Vernick & Parker, 2012). One Vision One Life was a similar program that formerly operated in Pittsburgh; however, it differed from the CURE Violence model in its implementation. One Vision One Life is described on page 16.

A related strategy is to intervene after a violent act occurs, in order to prevent retaliation. While unlike CURE Violence, this approach is still considered a promising practice. Examples include the Violence Intervention Project (VIP) in Baltimore and Caught in the Crossfire in Oakland, Calif. These programs send trained intervention staff into trauma centers to talk with victims of gunshots, stabbings and beatings in an effort to prevent the next violent act.

**Violence Intervention Project**

In Baltimore, VIP team members provide assessment, counseling and social support to victims so that they can “make critical changes in their lives,” recognizing that “victims of violence may also be perpetrators of violence” (Cooper, 2006). Victims who agree to participate in the program are paired with case managers or outreach workers who assist them in putting together action plans for reducing their violence risk factors and link them with community providers and peer support groups. They also help victims address requirements of parole/probation or court orders. The results of a three-year randomized controlled trial showed that the intervention group was only one-third as likely to be arrested for a violent crime as the control group (Cooper, 2006).

**Caught in the Crossfire**

In Oakland, Calif., the Caught in the Crossfire program uses peer counselors to go into the hospital to try to persuade victims, ages 12 through 20, to avoid violence. A retrospective case control study found that, six months after the intervention, the youth who had received the service were less likely to be arrested for any offense; there were no statistically significant differences in the rates of re-injury or death (Becker, Hall, Ursic, Jain & Calhoun, 2004).
In Milwaukee, Wis., the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission is interrupting violence by involving agencies and community members in careful examinations of each homicide. Components of the strategy, which was named an “effective practice” on the National Institute of Justice’s Crime Solutions website, include:

1. Real-time responses to homicides by social service agencies, who respond with crisis intervention, support and services for victims’ families

2. Monthly homicide reviews (each homicide is reviewed individually) by a team including a community–police liaison, police officers, members of special units, the district attorney, representatives from the office of the U.S. Attorney and other federal agencies, and the medical examiner, as well as reviews of closed cases with community members

3. Community service provider reviews of closed cases and a careful, retrospective look at incidents; information gathered from this process is then used in the criminal justice review to raise awareness and assist in handling current cases and establishing preventive community resources

4. Community reviews that educate the community about the nature of homicides and shootings in the intervention districts

**Directed patrols that target illegal guns and ammunition**

An effective strategy for raising the risk of apprehension among violent offenders is to conduct directed patrols of targeted areas where there is probable cause of a high degree of illegal gun carrying. This strategy can reduce gun crimes legally and without undermining police-community relations when the following elements are in place: the highest-risk individuals in an area are targeted for police attention (as opposed to an entire neighborhood); police are trained in how to conduct checks for illegal guns and ammunition within constitutional bounds; and police are carefully supervised.

The following examples highlight the potential effectiveness of directed patrols:

- In Kansas City, a crime-gun intervention strategy led to a 49 percent drop in gun crimes in the targeted area, compared with no changes in a similar area of the city where no intervention had taken place (Sherman, Shaw & Rogan, 1995). Indianapolis saw gun crimes decrease by 50 percent through a similar approach.

- When the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police implemented a gun enforcement project in 1998, using carefully selected and well-trained officers, it reduced the number of shots fired and hospital-treated gunshot injuries in the areas studied (Cohen & Ludwig, 2003).

- Los Angeles developed a software tool to trace where guns used in crimes had been purchased and where they were later used, discovering that most guns used in crimes were being purchased locally and then transferred illegally. These data suggested to police that tighter enforcement of gun purchases could help to keep guns off the streets, so they sent letters to gun purchasers, reminding them that they could be criminally liable if their gun was used in a crime. This appears to have suppressed the illegal transferring of weapons in California, as did similar actions in Canada (Tita, 2008).
New York City's “field interviews,” which began in the 1990s, were designed so that police would drive to hot spots, get out of their patrol cars, question the people for whom there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement, and take action. (Nagin, Solow and Lum, publication forthcoming). If police had cause to believe that the individual was in possession of an illegal gun or contraband, for example, they could frisk the person. This approach, which came to be known as “stop, question, and frisk,” became controversial when what was designed as a specific protocol for trained officers morphed into a widespread practice that often involved disproportionate targeting of minority individuals. In at least some cases, police stopped and frisked people without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. New York City dropped its appeal of a federal district judge’s decision that found the city’s application of the practice was unconstitutional, and it has agreed to additional oversight (Weiser & Goldstein, 2014). New York Police Chief Bill Bratton stated that street stops will “remain a very basic tool in this Police Department” but that they will be done “at all times constitutionally, at all times respectfully, at all times compassionately” (Goldstein, 2014).

Even if done constitutionally, it is important to keep the focus of field interviews on serious crimes; arrests and prosecutions are expensive and, because the community will view the practice of questioning individuals for minor crimes as unfair, it can undermine hard-earned police legitimacy. Of stop, question, and frisk, Nagin, Solow and Lum write, “This choice of tactic may have reduced crime rates but at the expense of unnecessarily increasing the costs associated with the apprehension and punishment of individuals for minor offenses for which the social costs are arguably de minimis.” They also point out that, “Even if police target places with high concentrations of crime, they still rely heavily on citizens reporting suspicious behavior, and crime more generally, to them (Nagin, Solow and Lum, publication forthcoming).

Researchers also have found that security procedures in schools can play an important role in intercepting guns. In Chicago, “Youth found it very difficult to maintain a safe hiding place for their firearm. The modal choice was in one’s locker at school. Therefore, by increasing the risks of storage by having school police become more vigilant in their searching of lockers, youth gun carrying can be further reduced” (Cook et al., cited in Tita, Troshynski & Graves, 2007). Also in Chicago, researchers found that access to guns through the illegal gun market was much more limited than suggested by conventional wisdom and inner-city youth had a particularly difficult time gaining access to ammunition (Cook, Ludwig, Venkatesh & Braga, 2005).

**Targeting high-risk individuals with evidence-based services**

Preventing violence in the near term also involves addressing the behavioral health and other issues of youth and adults who are at high risk of involvement in violence. It begins with identifying these individuals and delivering programs from among a fairly short list of interventions that have been shown to impact violent behaviors (including behavioral health treatment and cognitive therapies).

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6 New York City police conducted 685,000 searches in 2011 alone. This included arrests of youth possessing small amounts of drugs.
The juvenile justice system can be a key point of intervention with high-risk youth and older children if it uses an effective approach — which Howell and others have defined as a system that:

- Assesses the young person’s risk and needs both in and out of the court system, and matches these with the appropriate level of supervision, sanctions and programs (Howell, 2003)
- Targets highest-risk individuals
- Focuses on a therapeutic approach to behavior change and minimizes coercion
- Is clear about the purpose of confinement and placement lengths, and aligns its practice with those purposes (Howell, 2003). “Youth who received community-based supervision and aftercare service were more likely to attend school, go to work, and avoid further offending during the six months after release, and longer supervision periods increased these benefits” (Mulvey, 2011).
- Implements a continuum of evidence-based community supervision and treatment programs that include intensive family therapy and cognitive therapy (Justice Policy Institute, 2013), along with drug and alcohol treatment. “A growing body of research documents the key role of the treatment component in reducing the subsequent criminal behavior of juvenile offenders, and the minimal or even negative effects of punitive interventions” (Lipsey, Howell, Kelly, Chapman & Carter, 2010).
- Operates well-developed parole supervision and transitional (re-entry) services (Howell, 2003)
- Provides treatment and other programs that research has shown to be effective, and delivers them with fidelity

The need to carefully select programs also applies to service providers outside of the juvenile justice system. Our review of over 200 of these programs included in the clearinghouses established by The Campbell Collaboration, Blueprints for Healthy Youth Development, and the U.S. Department of Justice (Crime Solutions and National Gang Prevention), as well as other research, showed that while many programs may have positive effects, very few have been found to be effective in reducing violence or aggression. Programs that have had a measurable impact on violence and aggression include the following cognitive-based programs for youth and their families:

**Aggression Replacement Training (ART)** has been shown to be effective with incarcerated juvenile offenders and with youth who have clinical behavioral disorders when implemented with fidelity. ART is a 10-week, 30-hour intervention that teaches social skills, anger control and moral reasoning to juveniles in groups of 8 to 12. After screening for risk and severity of behaviors, the youth learn pro-social skills to replace aggressive behaviors (Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2004; Gunderson & Svartdal, 2006, as reported by Crime Solutions,
A Washington State study found a benefit-to-cost ratio of 11.66 for ART, but indicated that the program reduced felony recidivism only when the service providers were “competent or highly competent.” This finding underscores the importance of implementing the model with qualified staff (Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2004).

**Functional Family Therapy (FFT)** is a 30-hour intervention for delinquent youth, ages 11 through 18, and their families. It is designed to improve family communication and supportiveness while decreasing dysfunctional behavior patterns. Program staff provide direct services to youth and families in their homes or in clinics, in the context of juvenile court or when the youth is exiting institutional placement. It sets targets for behavior change based on individual and family assessments. Clinical trials have demonstrated FFT’s effectiveness with delinquent and violent adolescents.

**Multisystemic Therapy (MST)** is an approach to treating serious antisocial behavior in youth; MST can be delivered at home, in schools, in community settings, or in specialized facilities such as detention centers. MST is based on the view that working with youth through their families is best, but that the youth also are part of a “network of interconnected systems that encompass individual, family, peer, school and neighborhood... and that it is often necessary to intervene in more than one of these systems. Evaluations using randomized experimental designs showed that it is effective in changing antisocial behaviors. The effects (on police arrests) continued several years after treatment” (Henggeler et al., 1998, reported in Sherman, 2002; Ogden & Hagen, 2006, reported by National Gang Prevention Clearinghouse, 2014).

**Stop Now and Plan (SNAP)**, developed by Toronto’s Child Development Institute more than 20 years ago, has been shown to reduce aggressive behaviors and build protective factors for younger high-risk children who have been involved in delinquent behavior. SNAP serves children age 6 through 11 who have been “clinically assessed as engaging in above-average levels of aggressive, destructive and/or other antisocial behavior.” Police and community agencies refer the children who, along with their parents, receive screening and assessment using validated risk assessment tools. The children and parents then participate in interventions during a 12-week period. The program’s components include a structured group that teaches children the “Stop Now and Plan” technique, a cognitive-behavioral self-control and problem-solving technique; a parenting group that teaches parents effective child management strategies; one-on-one family counseling; academic tutoring; and individual “befriending” for children who are not connected with positive, structured community-based activities and who require additional support.

Two randomized, controlled studies of SNAP showed significant reductions in aggression and delinquency, along with strengthening of protective factors, including positive peer relations and social competency. Significantly, the positive benefits were most pronounced among youth with the most severe behavioral problems. This study found that criminal charges for youth in the program were only 40 percent of those in the control group (Day & Augimeri, 1993; and Burke,

Violent crime has been reduced in places that have built a comprehensive system that includes these effective programs (e.g., Connecticut, Missouri, San Diego and Orange County, Calif.), (Lipsey, Howell, Kelly, Chapman & Carver, 2010). Some of the most dramatic results occurred in Connecticut, where violent crime arrests of juveniles 15 years and younger decreased by 51 percent over a 10-year period, and violent crime arrests of 16-year-olds decreased by 26 percent.

While we have focused primarily on high-risk juveniles in this section, the same concepts apply to high-risk adults who, in most cases, have already violated the law and are in jail and or on probation. Additional information about group membership can augment the validated risk and need screening tools used by the Allegheny County Jail and Adult Probation Office, improving their ability to identify, assess and treat these individuals within a structure of clear, predictable consequences.

**WHERE ALLEGHENY COUNTY STANDS IN IMPLEMENTING THESE BEST PRACTICES**

We compared these proven interventions with what is happening in Allegheny County today, using interviews and the few local evaluations that provided information about program effects on aggression or violence. Our conclusion: Although there is strong work in the area of directed patrols in Allegheny County, other strategies are either not in place or not reaching the target group of high risk individuals. The table below summarizes the findings upon which we based these conclusions, while the following section provides more detail.

**Allegheny County’s implementation of best practices**

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<th>MODEL APPROACH</th>
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<td>Violence interrupters</td>
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Focused deterrence in Allegheny County

Although the City of Pittsburgh has mounted a focused-deterrence initiative (Pittsburgh Initiative to Reduce Crime [PIRC]), it is not being implemented with fidelity. A description of PIRC, below, is followed by an assessment of local barriers to implementation of an effective focused-deterrence initiative.

Pittsburgh Initiative to Reduce Crime (2009 – Current)

**LOCATION:** Pittsburgh

**AIM:** Reduce street violence (homicides and shootings)

**RESULTS:** Services are being delivered to approximately 60 violent offenders each year; without data, unable to document effect on violence

The City of Pittsburgh launched PIRC as a replication of a focused-deterrence model that has been found to reduce shootings and homicides in Boston and other cities across the country.

PIRC has taken several key steps toward establishing a focused-deterrence program, including setting up the PIRC hotline for potentially violent individuals to call when they want help in redirecting their lives. When they call, they are connected with dedicated case managers at Goodwill of Southwestern PA, who assist with finding employment, education and training services.

In addition to contracting with Goodwill, PIRC also contracts with the non-profit organization Youth Opportunities Development (YOD), which provides a street outreach program that interviewees said was valuable in several ways. They said that YOD’s outreach and weekly problem-solving meetings with community members and government officials can help prevent violence by directly linking potentially violent individuals with Goodwill’s services; by sharing the reality of what is happening on the street with the members of PIRC who may not be as well-informed; by sharing ideas that community members have had about how best to prevent violence; and by forming a bridge between PIRC and the communities most affected by violence.

While these important elements of the program are working well, PIRC continues to suffer from the fact that, from the start, the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police was not convinced that PIRC would work and so has not fully participated in the program. Without their intelligence-sharing and social network analysis, the initiative has not been able to focus on groups of serious offenders and threats of prosecution communicated to targeted individuals at call-in sessions are not credible (if the most violent people are reached at all). The effort therefore fails to achieve the important goal of increasing the perceived risk of apprehension for shooting/violence.

The city continues to pay for PIRC’s services to high-risk offenders, but it is difficult to see how this program can “pull levers,” aside from those provided by Adult Probation, without the Bureau’s cooperation. Interviewees, including the police, made positive comments about the involvement of Adult Probation and Parole in PIRC, pointing out that probation officers were able to focus on high-risk offenders and use tools not available to police, including knocking on the doors of probationers and looking for illegal weapons.
Most local stakeholders agreed that some version of pulling levers was necessary, particularly in the City of Pittsburgh. Several suggested that Pittsburgh's mayor should start anew with a public safety director and chief of police who understand and support a Boston Ceasefire approach to pulling levers.

The barriers to successful local implementation of focused deterrence, as cited by law enforcement and other interviewees, include the following:

- In Pittsburgh, police leaders have not been convinced of the strategy’s effectiveness and so have not applied the strategy to prevent homicides. City police target whole neighborhoods with saturation patrols, rather than the network of violent groups and micro-places. The community’s sense of police legitimacy has suffered as a result.
- Strategic and shared use of intelligence is a challenge locally; too much information is kept within individual police bureaus and, in the city’s case, interviews suggest that information is not even shared among police within the Bureau.
- No known social network analysis is in use.
- Data on offenders are kept by each police or law enforcement agency separately, without a central repository for information sharing. This makes targeting criminal networks difficult. One interviewee said, “We fail to exchange information among our 117 departments in the county. There is no central database that everyone can put information into.”

Violence interrupter programs in Allegheny County

Allegheny County does not currently have a violence interrupter program, although it does have organizations that, with proper support, could take on this role. (The program that the county did have, One Vision One Life [OVOL], was not in regular communication with police nor did it focus sufficiently on group members.)

Since a CURE Violence–type program is an important element of a violence reduction and prevention strategy, we looked for local programs with the potential to develop street-level intelligence, dispute resolution, and access to the services that groups and individuals need. We found three: 1) YOD, which has been conducting street outreach for PIRC and has established strong relationships in highly-violent areas of the city. YOD has indicated that, with support, it could expand geographically as well as functionally to encompass the violence interrupter role; 2) the Community Violence Prevention Project, which began in January 2014 and is an intervention program modeled on the promising trauma-response program in Baltimore; and 3) YouthPlaces, which has a summer employment program for high-risk youth and a Gang Roundtable. While YouthPlaces' primary mission is not to serve as violence interrupters, it has brought group members together in positive ways.

The following provides a fuller description of the three programs referenced above.
One Vision One Life (2004 – 2011)
LOCATION: Pittsburgh
AIM: Prevent killings by peers
RESULTS: Not effective in reducing homicides

OVOL attempted to use street-level work and intelligence to find out about potential disputes and to intervene to stop violence between groups of violent offenders. It also provided support, programs and access to other services (e.g., drug and alcohol treatment, mental health treatment, job training) to decrease the likelihood that high-risk individuals would become involved in violent activity.

In these ways, the program was similar to CURE Violence and other violence interrupter programs that were developing during this time period. It also included a hospital-based intervention in which community coordinators would visit hospitals to meet with victims of violence to assess the likelihood that the violent act would lead to further violence. If violence appeared imminent, they would use their community and street connections to broker peaceful resolutions.

A 2011 RAND Corporation evaluation of OVOL found no decrease in homicides and an increase in gun assaults in neighborhoods targeted by the organization. RAND researchers indicated that, compared to similar initiatives in Chicago and Baltimore, OVOL did not systematically use documentation of activities to select actions in targeted neighborhoods, did not focus as heavily on active group members and high-risk individuals, and placed a wider range of demands on its community coordinators. Police and OVOL staff had lower levels of coordination than those in CURE Violence programs (Wilson, Chermak & McGarrell, 2011).

Community Violence Prevention Project (2014 – Present)
LOCATION: Pittsburgh
AIM: Prevent killings by peers
RESULTS: Not available because program was just implemented

The University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public Health began implementing this program in 2014. Based in hospitals and the community, it aims to prevent an estimated 10–20 percent of killings by peers by quickly engaging gunshot victims at the four trauma hospitals in Pittsburgh and following them back into the community to provide services and support. Trained social workers ask the victims to provide the names of high-risk contacts so that staff can call and meet with them to offer referrals to drug and alcohol treatment, mentoring and other services. The project also conducts a homicide review, but the approach differs from the effective practice used in Milwaukee because they do not currently include the police or multiple levels of the criminal justice system.
YouthPlaces (1997 – Present)

**LOCATION:** Allegheny County

**AIM:** Provide summer employment experience and positive social opportunities for at-risk youth; reduce youth violence

**RESULTS:** Participants say it reduces youth violence (survey)

YouthPlaces, which receives government, foundation and United Way funding, operates afterschool programs in many of the county’s neediest communities. YouthPlaces’ outreach work with at-risk youth has resulted in the development of several programs targeting youth gangs/groups. In addition to recruiting group members into its summer jobs program and holding events to bring together members of previously warring neighborhoods, outreach workers and volunteers meet monthly as a “Gang Roundtable” to share information and plan events. Many Roundtable members have prior gang experience and detailed knowledge of happenings on the streets of Allegheny County’s most violence-ridden communities. YouthPlaces has not attempted to measure its impact on violence, but the Roundtable has the potential to function as a violence interrupter strategy. YouthPlaces leadership has expressed an interest in fulfilling this role. Its collaboration with police is minimal at this point.

Directed patrols that target illegal guns and ammunition in Allegheny County

Allegheny County has mounted several initiatives to intercept illegal guns and ammunition: the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police’s firearm suppression patrol; the cross-jurisdictional Violence Control and Gun Unit (Braddock Task Force) that operated for three years; and the Violent Criminal Assessment and Strategic Targeting Initiative, which began in 2011 and is still in operation.


**LOCATION:** Pittsburgh

**AIM:** Reduce shots fired

**RESULTS:** Reduction in shots fired and hospital-treated gunshot injuries

The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police successfully reduced the number of illegal guns by increasing police patrols in targeted areas on certain days and times of the week. This permitted researchers to assess the program’s impact by comparing outcomes during times when the suppression was in effect and times when it was not (Cohen & Ludwig, 2003). The firearm suppression patrols were constructed “with concerns about individual rights and community–police relations in mind,” with “explicit guidelines on when officers could engage in pat-down safety frisks and specific reporting requirements of the circumstances that precipitated more intrusive searches.” Commanders hand-picked the officers for these patrols based on their “professional attitude and demeanor in citizen encounters” and provided intensive training. Researchers found that Pittsburgh’s police patrols “may have reduced shots fired by as much as 34 percent” and reduced hospital-treated assault gunshot injuries by 71 percent on days when the patrols operated in treatment areas, without crime displacement to other areas (Cohen & Ludwig, 2003). Moreover, “No citizen complaints were filed against the Pittsburgh police as a result of the new directed-patrol program” (Cohen & Ludwig, 2003).

**LOCATION:** Braddock, several other county jurisdictions, and three city neighborhoods  
**AIM:** Reduce violent crime  
**RESULTS:** 642 arrests, 207 firearms confiscated, homicides decreased by 50 percent

The Violence Control and Gun Unit, in place from 2006 through 2009, used directed patrols to focus on the “hot people” in several parts of the county, including Braddock. This effort, which was funded by asset forfeiture, stands out for its cross-jurisdictional collaboration that involved the full-time redeployment of four Allegheny County sheriffs, five Pittsburgh Police officers, and two Allegheny County District Attorney investigators. They concentrated their crime prevention and control efforts in areas where “individuals in the crime community knew they could operate with impunity” because the smaller, part-time police forces there did not have the resources to combat the spike in gang and violent activity. This unit worked to provide an “overt police presence,” to conduct investigations, and to make cases that resulted in several federal indictments. The number of homicides in the targeted areas declined from 21 in 2006 to 10 in 2009 (Medical Examiner data, provided by the Allegheny County Department of Human Services, 2014).

This unit “evaporated” when the asset forfeiture money that funded the effort was spent. District Attorney Stephen Zappala testified in November 2013 that he would like to launch another such task force to focus on crime in the eastern part of the county; several stakeholders expressed strong support for this idea with others speaking more generally about the need for “more coordination across municipalities,” more “data sharing” or “shared intelligence.” Zappala estimated that funding such an effort would require about $475,000 annually for direct personnel, and would require high levels of cross-jurisdictional cooperation.

**Violent Criminal Assessment and Strategic Targeting Initiative (2011 – current) and Federal Initiatives**

**LOCATION:** Allegheny County  
**AIM:** Reduce violent gun crime and street violence by targeting repeat offenders  
**RESULTS:** Arrest and prosecution of violent offenders

The Allegheny County Police assembled a working group of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies operating in Allegheny County to: jointly identify the repeat violent offenders and groups they could target; share information and resources; and mount investigations that could lead to the arrest of high-impact offenders.

The group shares the intelligence needed to identify hot spots within Allegheny County and their knowledge about the most violent offenders. Federal agencies then facilitate prosecutions for gun and drug charges. In 2013, The Violent Criminal Assessment and Strategic Targeting Initiative (VICAST) was credited with a series of raids in Munhall, West Mifflin and Homestead that led to the arrest and federal grand jury indictments of 34 gang members. VICAST is an ongoing effort.
The FBI led the investigation in the Homestead area as part of its national Safe Streets Violent Crime Initiative. Safe Streets provides federal resources that pay police departments to assign detectives and officers to work as special agents for the FBI. They report to FBI supervisors and are trained to work on drug and gun cases as part of the Bureau’s “enterprise investigations.” These investigations involve “combining short-term, street-level enforcement activity with such sophisticated techniques as consensual monitoring, financial analysis and Title III wire intercepts investigations ... to root out and prosecute the entire gang, from the street-level thugs and dealers up through the crew leaders and ultimately the gang’s command structure” (http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/gangs/violent-gangs-task-forces).

In addition to the Safe Streets Initiative, the U.S. Department of Justice has, at times, authorized an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) that unites federal, state and local law enforcement in a coordinated investigation and prosecution of the most serious drug traffickers.

**Targeting high-risk individuals with evidence-based services in Allegheny County**

Juvenile Probation, Adult Probation and the Allegheny County Jail have been working to implement evidence-based programs and practices for both juvenile and adult offenders. They are assessing risk and need, using this information to tailor case plans and level of supervision (e.g., higher-risk individuals receive more supervision by a probation officer), make sanctions clear, provide alternatives to detention/incarceration, and deliver support, treatment and services. These changes have been shown to be effective in reducing re-arrests; the Allegheny County Jail Collaborative’s Reentry Program showed a 24 percent reduction in the probability of re-arrest, and Juvenile Probation’s programs showed a similar reduction in recidivism. However, neither effort has focused on violent offenders.

The criminal justice and human services systems also fund several of the evidence-based programs noted in this report (e.g., cognitive-based therapies, substance abuse treatment and prevention programs for children and youth). What is not clear is whether the youth and adults who are at high risk of violent behavior/crime are enrolled in these programs, since this information is not tracked and there is no mechanism for identifying high-risk individuals across systems (e.g., education, human services, criminal justice).

The locally-implemented practices and services outlined below have been shown to have an effect on violence.

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10 Juvenile Probation Office data provided March 2014 and Urban Institute report on the Allegheny County Jail Collaborative provided to local foundations, February 2014.
Evidence-based practices within the Allegheny County Juvenile Probation Office

LOCATION: Allegheny County

AIMS: Reduce recidivism among delinquent youth

RESULTS: Preliminary data indicate reductions in recidivism

Allegheny County’s Juvenile Probation Office has been working with national experts to implement best practices, including the following (as listed in the 2012 annual report):

- Alternatives to detention, including the Hartman shelter for juveniles, a 24-bed facility for males,11 detention in the home by using electronic monitoring; and, for 10-through-14-year-olds, Youth Enrichment Services (community supervision, school attendance monitoring, and intense in-home mentoring services for juveniles and their families)

- Risk/needs assessments using the Youth Level of Service instrument12

- Case disposition and planning based on the assessment

- Community-based intake and probation, including a school-based probation program that is the “largest in the Commonwealth” (Allegheny County Juvenile Probation Annual Report 2012)

- Aftercare for juvenile offenders when they return to the community

- Day treatment services, through The Academy and Vision Quest

- Placement at a state facility for juveniles who pose a serious risk to public safety, or Youth Forestry Camps for less serious offenders

- Truancy prevention and intervention for chronic, habitual truants

- Community service and paid employment

Evidence-based practices within Allegheny County Adult Probation and the Allegheny County Jail Collaborative

LOCATION: Allegheny County

AIM: Reduce recidivism

RESULTS: Reduction in arrest probability (Reentry Program) and arrests (Day Reporting Centers)

The Allegheny County Jail Collaborative’s Reentry Program focuses on medium- and high-risk offenders, providing a variety of supportive services both during incarceration and for several months following release. These services include drug and alcohol treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy, education and training, housing assistance, and job placement assistance. The program has demonstrated success in reducing the probability of re-arrest by 24 percent, a statistically significant amount (Urban Institute presentation to Pittsburgh-area foundations, February 2014).

Because the program has not sought to affect street violence, however, its impact on violent offenses is not known; also, it has not developed the kind of “pulling levers” approach to re-entry that has been tried in Boston.
Allegheny County has two Day Reporting Centers (DRCs) operated by Adult Probation. The DRCs also target higher-risk offenders who have probation as part of their sentence, providing a one-stop shop for services in the community and more intensive supervision by probation officers. Located in the East End and Arlington areas of Pittsburgh, DRCs provide assessment and referral to treatment for substance use disorders, as well as education, job placement services and housing assistance. An evaluation by DHS showed that DRC participants were significantly less likely to commit another crime than offenders at the same risk levels who did not have the services of a DRC (DHS, January 2013).

**Evidence-based services for high-risk individuals in Allegheny County (current)**

**LOCATION:** Allegheny County

**AIMS:** Reduce aggression and violence

**RESULTS:** National evaluations show reductions in aggression and violence; local evaluations of SNAP show similarly positive results

DHS recently reviewed its array of programs for children, youth and families to determine which were evidence-based. Three have been shown to be effective in reducing violence and aggression: Aggression Replacement Training (ART), MST and SNAP.

ART is in use at Auberle, Bradley Center, Glade Run, Melting Pot Ministries, Wesley Spectrum, Outreach Teen and George Junior. MST is provided at the Mars Home for Youth (operated by MHY Family Services) through contracts with DHS and Juvenile Probation. Youth can spend three to six months there, depending on their progress, and the Mars Home for Youth has indicated that it has the potential to serve more youth. Various forms of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) also are available through these and other agencies.

DHS contracts for SNAP services through Auberle and Holy Family Institute. A randomized controlled trial of the program at Auberle found “sharp reductions in the level of aggressive behavior and sustained lower levels of aggressive behavior; similar reductions on measures of other disruptive behavior problems” and “the positive benefits of SNAP were more pronounced among youth with the most severe level of behavioral problems... the number of subsequent criminal charges for youth in SNAP was approximately 40 percent of the control group” (Burke, 2012).

When DHS and the Allegheny County Juvenile Court sponsored a two-year demonstration of SNAP at both Auberle and Holy Family Institute in 2008–2009, it found that the model was being implemented with very high fidelity, achieving excellent results with a sample of 220 boys, none of whom had returned to Juvenile Court as of the June 2011 report on the project (Canfield & Burke, 2011). The report expressed concern, however, that police departments and agencies with firsthand knowledge of boys’ contact with the police were making far too few referrals to SNAP.

13 Outside the scope of DHS’s inventory was an assessment of the need among high-risk youth in the county, compared with program capacity, and whether high-risk youth are actually being served by these programs.
One caution that several researchers expressed about even evidence-based secondary prevention programs is that they often enroll adolescents who are only at a moderate or low risk of serious offending because adolescents who are at high risk for serious offending and violence are the least likely to be compliant with services, are very difficult to work with, and often have parents and guardians who are not available to authorize services or who refuse to participate. The best prevention efforts, therefore, may be unavailable to the highest-risk adolescents.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are designed to increase the safety of Allegheny County’s residents and provide the break in violence that communities need to rebuild:

1. Police in the City of Pittsburgh and the municipalities most affected by street violence should fully adopt a focused deterrence approach that strives to reduce shootings and build police legitimacy within their communities. They should also designate a police official responsible for overseeing the implementation of the focused deterrence approach.

Given the experience to date in the City of Pittsburgh, we recommend that Pittsburgh’s mayor:

• Ensure that the new police chief and public safety director view preventing violence as part of their mission and fully support making focused deterrence a regular part of policing, including making it a priority to collect and share the intelligence required to put focused deterrence into effect
• Designate a police official responsible for overseeing the implementation of the program, ensuring that evaluation data are collected and used to inform program changes
• Hire a strong leader to rejuvenate and recommit to the collaboration among police, community, and the criminal justice and human services systems; this collaboration must be coordinated with the Chief of Police

2. The Allegheny County Jail Collaborative, Adult Probation and Juvenile Probation should work with city and other police departments to plan ways in which they can “pull levers” that are unique to their populations. These include sending a clear message to each gang-involved and violent offender or delinquent that Probation will carefully monitor them for violent illegal activity, and, if necessary, follow through with more intensive supervision.

3. As part of a focused-deterrence strategy, the city and county should consider funding a CURE Violence model in the most violent areas of Allegheny County; this model should be implemented with fidelity and within an experienced, credible organization.

4. The Community Violence Prevention Project should adopt best practices in its homicide review process (e.g., the effective practice used in Milwaukee).

5. Police in the City of Pittsburgh and other municipalities in Allegheny County should train police in ways to enhance police/community relations (with a focus on both the rationale for and approaches to building police legitimacy) and conduct/make public ongoing measurements of the state of those relations.
6. Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies should continue cross-jurisdictional efforts to reduce the number of illegal guns and amount of illegal ammunition in the city and county, through the efforts of well-trained and supervised police, while respecting constitutional bounds and satisfying the requirements of police legitimacy.

7. DHS and Allegheny County Juvenile Probation should develop a comprehensive plan for identifying and treating youth at very high risk of future violence. Components of this plan should include:
   - Selecting (or creating) an assessment that can be used to identify these young people across systems (schools, child welfare, juvenile probation) and by family and community agencies
   - Developing mechanisms to 1) ensure that these high-risk youth and their families are referred to and receive services, and 2) monitor their progress and refer them to other interventions, as needed
   - Conducting an inventory of evidence-based programs currently available in the county that reduce aggression and violence, and that incorporate effective practices with fidelity; assessing the degree to which high-risk youth are being served by these programs; and making additional investments to eliminate gaps as identified
   - Investing in the resources necessary to reduce the caseloads of the juvenile probation officers handling the highest-risk cases and to fully implement a system of graduated sanctions for juveniles on probation

8. The Allegheny County Jail Collaborative should develop a plan for identifying and providing effective services to adults at high risk of committing or being victims of street violence, including inmates and probationers at high risk because of their group affiliation, substance abuse and/or mental health issues. Such a shift would not only reduce recidivism, but could also reduce the number of homicides in Pittsburgh and Allegheny County.

9. Those organizations that share in the work of reducing street violence should commit to reporting their progress using a common set of measures, including indicators that demonstrate that they are reaching the high-risk youth and adults, and indicators of their programs’ impacts on shootings, homicides and other violent crime victimization.

10. Police should share data and intelligence across jurisdictions to enhance their ability to track groups and crimes across borders and support their coordinated strategies.

11. City and county agencies should develop sustainable funding approaches to reducing street violence.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWEES

- Dr. Steven Albert, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh
- Matt Barron, City of Pittsburgh
- Mark Bibro, Birmingham Foundation
- Rashad Birdsong, Community Empowerment Association
- Dr. Al Blumstein, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University
- Assistant Chief Maurita Bryant, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police
- The Hon. Ricky Burgess, Pittsburgh City Council
- Esther Bush, Urban League of Pittsburgh
- Claire Capristo, Allegheny County Courts
- Russ Carlino, Allegheny County Juvenile Probation
- Reverend Earlene Coleman, Bethlehem Baptist Church, McKeesport
- Chris Connors, Allegheny County Courts
- The Hon. Ed Gainey, Pennsylvania House of Representatives
- Richard Garland, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh
- Jay Gilmer, Pittsburgh Initiative to Reduce Crime
- Reverend Glenn Grayson, Wesley Center AME Zion Church
- Dr. Karen Hacker, Allegheny County Health Department
- Dr. David Harris, University of Pittsburgh Law School
- David Hickton, U.S. Attorney for the Western District, Pennsylvania
- Brandi Hudson, Auberle
- Kevin Jenkins, The Pittsburgh Foundation
- Wayne Jones, The Heinz Endowments
- Stephen Kaufman, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District, Pennsylvania
- David Kennedy, John Jay College
- Dan Koniecza, Criminal Justice Advisory Board
- Lisa Kuzma, Richard King Mellon Foundation
- Dr. Rolf Loeber, Pittsburgh Youth Study
- Tony Macklin, Hunt Foundation
- President Judge Jeffrey Manning, Allegheny County Courts
- Thomas McCaffrey, Allegheny County Courts
- Acting Police Chief Regina McDonald, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police
Appendix A: Interviewees (continued)

- Superintendent Charles Moffatt, Allegheny County Police
- Sheriff William Mullen, Allegheny County Sheriff
- Dr. Edward Mulvey, University of Pittsburgh
- Dr. Daniel Nagin, Carnegie Mellon University
- Robert Nelkin, United Way of Allegheny County
- Kerry O’Donnell, Falk Foundation
- Margaret Philbin, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District, Pennsylvania
- Ron Seyko, Allegheny County Adult Probation and Parole
- Fred Thieman, Buhl Foundation
- YouthPlaces staff and Gang Roundtable
APPENDIX B: OTHER CRIMINAL JUSTICE STRATEGIES EXAMINED

Some approaches, while they may be useful for other purposes, have not been shown to reduce street violence and thus are not highlighted as options in this study. These include the following criminal justice strategies:

- **Sweeps:** These aggressive, usually sudden, enforcement actions, though often used to break up crime rings, are not effective in suppressing violence. When applied by gang suppression unit, this tactic “results in the arrest of a large number of youth who are not gang members; of those that were, very few had committed serious crimes” (Howell, reported in Vuong & Silva, 2008).

- **Adding more police:** This is not an effective strategy, if the additional police are not targeted to hot spots (James Levine).

- **Broken windows:** This strategy is based on the theory that addressing small problems (such as broken windows in abandoned houses) before they escalate discourages crime and encourages citizens to be concerned about keeping their community in good condition and crime-free. While this strategy may contribute to community improvement, its direct impact on violence is questionable, and its implementation in the form of zero-tolerance enforcement activities may have negative effects as well.

  “The evidence for the broken windows/zero tolerance arrests hypothesis is inconsistent and the research designs are only moderately strong. ... The larger concern about zero tolerance is its long-term effect on people arrested for minor offenses. ... The data suggest that zero tolerance programs should be evaluated in relation to the long-term effects on those arrested, as well as short-term effects on community crime rates” (Sherman & Eck, 2002).

- **Random patrols:** A Kansas City study found that random patrols are not effective in preventing crime. Nagin et al. also point to “an inherent weakness of random patrol — its effectiveness in preventing crime may be necessarily small because heightened patrol activity is likely applied with equal probability to the hot spots and to the much larger universe of geographic areas where crime is not concentrated. The key insight of the hot spots policing innovators was that random patrol activity is therefore an inherently inefficient deployment of police resources” (Nagin, Solow & Lum, publication forthcoming).

- **Rapid response to crime reports:** Spelman and Brown (1984, as reported in Telep and Weisburd, 2011) showed that such an emphasis is of little significance, because calls to police generally do not happen until five minutes after the crime has been committed.

- **Gun buyback programs:** Gun buyback programs fail to reduce gun violence (Welsh & Hoshi, 2002, citing reviews of programs in Seattle and St. Louis).

- **Mandatory sentencing/extending already-long sentences:** Neither the fact of incarceration nor the length of imprisonment appears to deter future violent behavior (Nagin, Cullen, & Jonson, 2009; Nagin and Durlauf, 2010, 2012). Rather, Nagin and Durlauf (2010) argue that “short but certain incarceration deters.”
• **Punitive interventions**: These have “minimal or even negative effects” upon youth (Lipsey, Howell, Kelly, Chapman & Carver, 2010). A longitudinal study of pathways to desistence of adolescent offenders also found that “longer stays in juvenile facilities did not reduce reoffending; institutional placement even raised offending levels in those with the lowest level of offending” (Mulvey, 2011).

• **Boot camps**: Boot camps produced no significant effects on recidivism in three out of four evaluations and trended toward increased recidivism in two studies. A fourth evaluation showed significant harmful effects on youth (Wilson, MacKenzie and Mitchell, 2008).

• **Prison visitation/scared-straight for youth**: Scared-straight programs have a negative effect; they do not reduce violence, and they may increase criminal behaviors (Petrofina, Turpin-Petrofina & Buehler, 2003, as reported in Lipsey, Howell, Kelly, Chapman & Carver, 2010).

• **Neighborhood Watch**: One study found a reduction in burglaries but three others found no effect (Sherman & Eck in Sherman, 2002).

• **Storefront police offices and community meetings**: No reduction in violent crimes resulted from community meetings, door-to-door police contacts, or storefront police offices (Sherman & Eck in Sherman, 2002).

• **Waivers to Adult Court/Court System for youth**: Another popular justice system approach to deterring youth violence, waivers to adult court, can have particularly harmful effects on delinquent youth. The idea behind this approach, “adult time for adult crime,” was widely accepted into practice in the 1990s, when youth violence escalated dramatically. Evaluations of these programs suggest that they increase future criminal behavior rather than deter it, as advocates of this approach had hoped. Moreover, placing youth in adult criminal institutions exposes them to harm. Results from a series of reports indicate that young people placed in adult correctional institutions, compared to those placed in institutions designed for youth, are eight times as likely to commit suicide, five times as likely to be sexually assaulted, twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and 50 percent as likely to be attacked with a weapon (Bishop & Frazier, 2000; and Fagan & Zimring, 2000).